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Fighting the Appearance of Corruption 
Ronald M. Levin* 
It is a special honor to be the recipient of a chair named after Dean 
Henry Hitchcock. After all, he was a descendant of Ethan Allen—and 
when it comes to chairs, these Ethan Allen people ought to know 
what they’re doing. 
But I also have more important reasons to feel honored by my 
new association with this law school’s first dean. He had a biography 
of achievement and eminence that speaks for itself. As many of you 
know, in a few months I will become chair of the ABA Section of 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. When you put that 
together with the chair I am receiving today, and you also bear in 
mind that I have been chair of two sections of the Association of 
American Law Schools, pretty soon I may have an entire dining room 
set. Nevertheless, if I should start thinking, from time to time during 
the coming year, that being chair of the ABA section is a really big 
deal, it will be helpful to remember that Dean Hitchcock was 
president of the entire ABA—in addition to being a dean, a provost, a 
teacher of eight separate law school courses, a newspaper editor, a 
political party delegate, a founder of the local YMCA, and a legal 
advisor to General William T. Sherman. Service as the Hitchcock 
Professor will be a small reminder that there are always more worlds 
to conquer and more leaders to emulate in the proud traditions of this 
distinguished law school. 
In my remarks today, I want to revisit some issues that I explored 
a few years ago when I wrote a study on congressional ethics and 
political corruption for the ABA.1 Over the years, our society has 
become increasingly intolerant of what we regard as ethical conflicts 
between public responsibilities and selfish concerns. 
 
 * Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University. This Article is a slightly 
revised version of an address delivered by the author on March 29, 2000, on the occasion of his 
installation as the Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law. 
 1. See Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of 
Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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We used to shrug off some of these conflicts. For example, one of 
Dean Hitchcock’s colleagues on the law school faculty was a United 
States District Judge, Samuel Treat, as was typical of legal education 
in those days. It seems that members of the faculty would litigate 
cases before the judge while he was their colleague—and so did the 
Dean.2 Apparently this situation elicited no insuperable objections at 
the time. Today, however, I’m sure it would raise some eyebrows, 
and it would probably lead to a disqualification motion alleging that, 
if nothing else, it created the “appearance of impropriety.” It would 
be thought to look bad—even though, to judge from the reported 
cases, the faculty’s record of success before Judge Treat wasn’t all 
that great.3 (Some things about faculty collegiality don’t change over 
time.) 
This increased sensitivity about appearances is at the heart of the 
themes I will explore today. I will discuss it in the context of two 
very topical events: the recent presidential primary campaign and a 
recent Supreme Court case. 
I 
The presidential campaign event was a controversy involving 
Senator John McCain. The New York Times reported in January 
2000 that Senator McCain had written letters to the Federal 
Communications Commission urging it to hurry up and decide a 
license application that had been pending for two years.4 The 
applicant turned out to be a person who had contributed more than 
$20,000 to McCain’s presidential campaign. The implication of the 
story was that the Senator, despite his fondness for presenting himself 
as the foe of special interest politics, was in fact misusing his position 
as chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee for the benefit of 
people who had bought his influence. It did not take Governor Bush 
 
 2. Union Trust Co. v. St. Louis Ry., 24 F. Cas. 710 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 14,403); 
The Red Wing, 14 F. 869 (E.D. Mo. 1882); United States v. Wynn, 9 F. 886 (E.D. Mo. 1882); 
In re Bignall, 9 F. 385 (E.D. Mo. 1881); In re Morrison, 17 F. Cas. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1873) (No. 
9,839). 
 3. E.g., Union Trust, 24 F. Cas. at 718 (Treat, J., dissenting); Wynn, 9 F. at 895. 
 4. Stephen Labaton, McCain Urged F.C.C. Action on Issue Involving Supporter, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at A1. 
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long to pick up on this charge and use it against the Senator on the 
campaign trail. 
The press was equally quick to realize that this story brought back 
memories of the Keating Five episode of a decade ago—and not 
merely because McCain had been one of the Keating Five himself. 
The Keating episode had involved a very similar sequence of facts. 
McCain had been one of five senators who had met with the 
chairman of one of the federal banking agencies to urge him to ease 
up on their friend Charles Keating, the president of an insolvent 
savings and loan association. Keating just happened to be a wealthy 
and influential campaign contributor and fundraiser. He had raised 
over $100,000 for McCain, and even more for some of the other 
senators.5 The meeting between the senators and the banking 
chairman was an example, although an extreme example, of what 
members of Congress call “constituent service,” that is, going to bat 
with an administrative agency on behalf of an aggrieved citizen. 
When I studied this practice and the congressional ethics 
controversy that had grown out of it, I came to understand that 
members of Congress themselves think of meetings and letters like 
Senator McCain’s as completely routine and part of their job.6 They 
would say that citizens whose cases are stuck in bureaucratic limbo 
should be able to enlist congressional help. After all, they would 
argue, the FCC does sometimes drag its feet when implementing 
various programs. When that happens, who else would you call to get 
the agency moving, if not someone like the chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, Senator McCain? Furthermore, McCain had 
played by what members of Congress think of as the unwritten rules 
of this game. He had only asked for prompt resolution of the case, not 
for a favorable outcome.7 
Still, outsiders frequently see these things differently: as pressure 
to throw the case, or at least interference with the deliberative 
process. Congress therefore has a public relations problem. During 
 
 5. SENATE COMM. ON ETHICS, INVESTIGATION OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, S. REP. 
NO. 102-223, at 18-19, 21 (1991) [hereinafter ETHICS COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 6. See Levin, supra note 1, at 19. 
 7. McCain’s Letter To F.C.C. and Excerpts from Replies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at 
A18 (text of the Senator’s letter). 
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the Keating Five controversy, the Senate Ethics Committee’s special 
counsel suggested, as did others, that the five senators should be 
punished simply because they had created an “appearance of 
impropriety.”8 The Ethics Committee ultimately did reprimand some 
of the senators for this reason,9 and it has criticized other senators 
since for other bad “appearances.”10 
The appearances theme returned during the McCain controversy. 
One newspaper column said that, although McCain had not actually 
done anything improper, he had “carelessly and unnecessarily 
damaged the reputation he has worked so hard to acquire,” because a 
candidate who “complains about big money and politics is asking for 
trouble if he or she even seems to be doing favors for wealthy 
contributors.”11 
I criticized this sort of emphasis on appearances in my article. I 
argued that it was unfair to punish a member of Congress just 
because his or her conduct had caused a bad press.12 The appearance 
standard is vague and subjective, and it’s also a copout. I said that the 
Ethics Committee should come to grips with the hard cases and 
display leadership by explaining to senators what they can and cannot 
do. The Committee would not fulfill this function if it were to find an 
ethics violations simply because some people (not themselves) 
disapproved of the accused’s conduct. 
On the other hand, I was not saying that ethics committees should 
condemn only those activities that are inherently corrupt and 
unethical. I drew upon a body of scholarship that had suggested that 
the committees should devise rules to ban conduct that tends toward 
corruption. 13 So, for example, to apply this reasoning to the McCain 
 
 8. E.g., Phil Kuntz, Senators Ponder How to Treat Appearance of Wrongdoing , 49 
CONG . Q. WKLY. REP. 228 (1991). 
 9. ETHICS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 17, 19. 
 10. Glenn R. Simpson, Ethics Finds No Wrongdoing in Lautenberg Memos but Warns of 
‘Appearance’ Created, ROLL CALL, July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl 
File. 
 11. Foster, McCain Tars His Image Unnecessarily, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL , Jan. 8, 
2000, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 12. Levin, supra note 1, at 99-104. 
 13. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS 124-25 (1995); ABA Comm. on 
Gov’t Standards, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics and Government Ethics Regulation , 45 
ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 297 (1993) (Cynthia Farina, Reporter) (arguing that ethics rules should 
address the “potential for . . . impropriety”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/6
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situation, the Senate now has a rule that says that a senator should not 
make a decision to intervene at an agency on the basis of political 
contributions.14 In other words, contributors should not receive more 
favorable treatment than similarly situated noncontributors. Such a 
rule protects against potential corruption, even where no illicit 
bargain between the politician and the contributor has occurred. 
However, the Senate has not completely banned intervention on 
contributors’ behalf, and according to my article’s thesis, the Senate 
should not condemn those interventions simply because some people 
say it looks suspicious.  
In short, I argued that regulation to curb impropriety or tendencies 
toward impropriety was legitimate, but regulation to curb a mere 
“appearance” of impropriety was not. 
II 
Keep that thought in mind as I turn to my second topical point of 
reference, the case of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,15 
which the Supreme Court decided in January 2000. This case upheld 
a Missouri law under which you or I may contribute no more than 
$1075 per campaign to a candidate for governor or other statewide 
office. My colleague Bruce La Pierre litigated this case for the 
plaintiffs who challenged the limits. He may have won a moral 
victory, but he lost the actual vote, six to three. 
Before the case came down, everyone understood that the Court 
would use Shrink Missouri to revisit the principles that it had set forth 
in 1976 in the famous case of Buckley v. Valeo.16 In Buckley, the 
Court had found various campaign finance restrictions 
unconstitutional as violations of the First Amendment, but it had 
upheld limits of $1000 on individual contributions to candidates for 
Congress. The Court had said that people who made contributions 
were less entitled to First Amendment protection than other political 
speakers.17 One of the Court’s reasons for this conclusion was that 
 
 14. Senate Rule XLIII(3), reprinted in  SENATE CMTE. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 
SENATE ELECTION GUIDEBOOK, at 162 (2000). 
 15. 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000). 
 16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 17. Id. at 20-23. 
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the $1000 limit would directly serve the government’s interest in 
preventing “corruption and the appearance of corruption.”18 
In the years following Buckley, the Supreme Court had appeared 
increasingly skeptical about campaign finance laws. So most tea-leaf 
readers assumed that in Shrink Missouri the Court would find some 
way to limit Buckley and strike down Missouri’s $1075 limit. Various 
theories developed as to how the Court would accomplish this. 
Bruce’s argument was that recent First Amendment law has required 
the government to prove a factual basis for its speech restrictions. 
The state had supplied very little evidence that its limits were needed 
to protect against “corruption and the appearance of corruption,”19 
and so the limits should fail for lack of proof. 
The predictions were wrong. The $1075 limit survived. Justice 
Souter’s opinion for the Court dismissed the argument that the state 
had not supplied enough proof of need for the limits.20 What is most 
important to my argument today is that he particularly emphasized 
the evidence that people in the state perceived a need for limits. He 
relied on newspaper accounts and editorials claiming that big money 
was afflicting Missouri politics.21 Whether the newspaper clippings 
were accurate or inaccurate, well-balanced or cockeyed, apparently 
did not matter, because they at least showed what people believed. 
Justice Souter also pointed out that Missouri had previously adopted 
campaign finance limits through a ballot proposition that had 
received 74% approval from the voters.22 This vote likewise attested 
to a perception that contribution limits were needed.23 Then, when 
Bruce relied on political science studies to attack the law, Justice 
Souter did not examine them at any length, in part because of “the 
absence of any reason to think that public perception has been 
influenced by the studies.”24 
If we believe these passages from Shrink Missouri, then, in a way, 
 
 18. Id. at 24-29. 
 19. See Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v. Nixon, 161 F.3d 519, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1999), 
rev’d, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000). 
 20. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. 897, 906-09 (2000). 
 21. Id. at 907. 
 22. Id. at 908. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/6
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the evidentiary question that Bruce raised has become entirely beside 
the point. If limits on contributions are permissible only in times and 
places where wide segments of the public believe that special 
interests exert too much influence over politics, then they are 
permissible in all times and places. The public always believes this, 
and it always will. Unless the Court modifies its language, the 
requirement of proof of need for restrictions might as well be 
rescinded entirely. 
As you probably have guessed, I think the Court made a mistake 
in continuing to rely on public perceptions as a justification for 
regulation. As a matter of First Amendment law, it is surprising 
enough, but I want to focus on some problems the rationale causes in 
the broader policy debate. As a premise for legislative action, I think 
the appearances rationale is troublesome for several reasons. 
First, it invites regulation on too indiscriminate a basis. In our 
scandal-oriented polit ical environment, accusations of wrongdoing 
can be, and are, leveled at virtually every political candidate in sight. 
What fundraising effort is not accused of being unsavory and making 
the candidate too beholden to special interests? We have to strike a 
balance between the restrictions we need to keep the system honest 
and the latitude we need if political discussion is to go forward. So, if 
we want to regulate any particular aspect of the system, we should 
ask whether it is a point in the system where restriction will do the 
most good and the least harm. The knowledge that a particular type 
of fund-raising has been drawn into question in an editorial or an 
advocacy group’s press releases is not a reliable guide to deciding 
whether it should be suppressed. 
For example, the voter initiative that Justice Souter mentioned as 
having passed with 74% voter approval had imposed even stricter 
contribution limits than the ones at issue in Shrink Missouri.25 
Contribution limits of $300 per election for statewide races, and even 
lower limits for more localized races, had “appeared” necessary to 
the electorate. Yet receiving contributions that are low, but not quite 
so low as that, would seem to be among the most innocuous ways in 
which a politician could possibly finance a campaign. In short, a 
 
 25. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding initiative unconstitutional). 
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focus on appearances creates a strong temptation to engage in 
superficial analysis of what kind of campaign finance reform is most 
needed. 
Second, the appearances rationale invites circular reasoning. In 
effect, it means that the most zealous and aggressive advocates of 
restriction can make accusations, whether well founded in fact or not, 
and then use the very fact that some people believe the charges as a 
reason to justify regulation. Political combat can create its own 
appearances. 
Third, the appearances rationale is self-defeating, because with 
restrictions will always come more occasions for accusations of 
noncompliance. Rules will always force campaign staffs to make 
judgment calls on debatable issues, and politicians and other partisans 
will always have incentives to accuse their opponents of fudging on 
the rules. The current campaign season amply furnishes us with 
examples of these charges. Sometimes the charges will be right and 
sometimes not, but in the heat of a political campaign, who can pause 
to find out for sure? I’m not saying that we should not have 
restrictions—only that if you believe that the reason to have them is 
to rid the process of negative ads, journalistic innuendos, and outrage 
on the talk shows concerning campaign contributions, you are 
guaranteed to be disappointed. The only way to prevent suspected 
evasions of the rules would be to eliminate all the rules. So, strict 
rules are not only a cure for the appearance of corruption, but also a 
leading cause of it. 
Now, I don’t have time today to explain how to solve all the 
problems of campaign finance regulation—my twenty minutes are 
about up. (If they’d given me thirty, I could have done it.) So I will 
focus on what to do about the appearances rationale. My suggestion 
grows out of what I said earlier. In Shrink Missouri the Court should 
have said that its language from Buckley needs adjustment. The 
central issue should be: what kinds of restrictions are needed to 
prevent corruption or a significant tendency toward corruption? By 
revising its test this way, the Court could improve its First 
Amendment analysis. This test wouldn’t keep the legislature from 
regulating the election process in the interest of fair and honest 
campaigns, but it would bring the constitutional and policy debate 
back into touch with reality. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/6
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Now, despite everything I’ve said, we all know that there is at 
least one sphere of public life in which appearances always matter—
namely, electoral politics. Legislators who aspire to higher office, or 
even re-election, can ill afford to ignore what Senator Bob Dole once 
called the “front-page test.” He said that “if we are not willing to read 
about an intervention on the front page of the newspapers, then we 
ought to think twice about making that phone call or writing that 
letter.”26 For Senator McCain, that test hit home in a most literal 
manner. 
However, we don’t have to concede a similar role for appearances 
in constitutional discourse or even in serious public policy debate—
especially when the debate occurs here in the university community. 
After all, if anyone is in a good position to analyze dispassionately 
how campaign finance regulation can fit into a healthy electoral 
system and our legal traditions of free speech, it ought to be us in the 
academy. A professional commitment to detached pursuit of the truth 
would seem to be among the aspirations that the Henry Hitchcock 
chair is designed to encourage. Those aspirations challenge us to 
remember that, if all we ask of reform is that it must address the 
appearance of corruption, we may ultimately find that we have given 
ourselves only the appearance of reform. 
 
 26. 137 CONG. REC. 12,316 (1991). 
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